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Abstract:
The relevance of feminism for argumentation has been the subject of lively debates recently. I
explore the viability of applying feminist categories to argumentation with a focus on the relevance
of gender in reasoning and rationality. Arguing from the view that particular practices of reasoning
are gendered, as operating within a gendered socio-political context, I examine the implications of
conditioned reasoning for a conception of reason. Are reasoning and rationality in some
fundamental sense conditioned, e.g., gendered? I argue for a conceptualization of reason as a
structural complex whose character can be conditioned yet is non-relativistic.
***
The question of the possible relevance of feminist analysis for conceptions of reason, argumentation theory, and
possibly even logic has recently given rise to some lively, if not to say heated debates.1 There are, of course,
various facets to this interaction, meeting with varying degrees of acceptance, and clearly one important factor is
which particular focus or area one has in mind. At one end of the spectrum perhaps might be potential
applications of gender categories in certain areas of critical thinking where, for example, the process of critically
analyzing reasoning takes place within the recognition of the significance of conceptual frameworks, bias, and
various contextual issues; feminism, as socio-political and conceptual critique, affords in this case the possibility
of yet another critical perspective and thus feminism and critical thinking would appear to have certain
compatibilities and points of contact. At the other end of the spectrum, in terms of feminist analyses which have
met with more resistance, would doubtless be certain feminist critiques of logic advancing indictments of
traditional logic as patriarchal, oppressive, and hegemonic, characterized for example as the "logic of
domination."2 Somewhere in between these two would lie feminist analyses of gender and reasoning, ranging
from critiques of traditional reason and rationality—with related critiques of epistemology and science—to the
exploration of the question of gender differences in reasoning, masculine and feminine styles of rationality and—
most provocatively—the question of masculine and feminine logic(s).
If we situate reason and reasoning in the broader context of philosophical discourse, what is also at issue in a
related, and often presupposed sense, is the viability of the interaction of feminism and philosophy. Here, too,
there are numerous facets, as there are in any interaction between feminism and the larger scholarly tradition.
These range from the application of a feminist critique—for example the analysis of questionable concepts or
models, of a perceived masculinist bias, or apparent deficiencies or lacunae in the account under question—to
the generating of a supplemental analysis which can redress these gender-based lacunae (women's history, as the
missing account, is a good example), to the more fundamental transformation of a field or discipline based on the
acknowledgement of hitherto overlooked features and criteria—such as gender. In the latter case feminist
analysis goes beyond critique to transformative discourse; but the transformation is predicated on and to a
degree eventually required by the critique.

In this paper I propose to explore some of the aspects of these issues with particular focus on the question of the
relevance of gender in reasoning and rationality. I begin by sketching some of the aspects of the related feminist
analysis of "gendered philosophy," where what is at issue is not only the potentially gendered aspects of the
discipline of philosophy, but of philosophical discourse in a more fundamental sense. I then proceed to outline, by
drawing on some of the implications of this above analysis, a framework for articulating a conception of gendered
reasoning based on a phenomenological-hermeneutic model which, I will argue, avoids some of the problems of
prevailing accounts of gendered or conditioned reasoning, while preserving a viable philosophical conception of
reason and rationality.

1. Gender as an Issue in Philosophy: Some Aspects
The interaction of feminism with the philosophical tradition has occasioned one of the most intriguing (and
volatile) arenas in the feminist analysis of the scholarly tradition. On the one hand, from the point of view of an
alleged masculine bias or inherent sexism, many feminists have long held that philosophy, as a discipline and as
historical discourse, has a particularly problematic history. It is therefore generally thought to be a very good
candidate for feminist analysis. On the other hand, though, given its traditional self-definition and character,
philosophy would appear to be the most impervious to a gender analysis: the very principles which constitute the
being of philosophical discourse would appear to be those which by definition transcend the cultural character
and particularity of gender analysis. A crucial component of the traditional goal, if not essence, of philosophical
discourse has always been the endeavour to articulate non-particular or trans-cultural claims; where particularity
or culturally-specific claims are generally considered to be too closely associated with relativism, itself anathema
for philosophy. As such, with the exception of the more obvious (and, it is to be hoped, uncontroversial) targets
of feminist critique—such as philosophical arguments for women's inferiority—it is often claimed that for many if
not most fundamental philosophical questions gender is not, or should not be, an issue.
On the surface, there would appear to be significant differences and incompatibilities between feminism and
philosophy. Feminism takes as its point of departure the significance of gender and sexual difference.3 That is to
say not only that gender constitutes a primary focus and orientation, but that a central defining principle for
feminist theory is the importance and effect of gender in shaping human experience. As such, a good deal of
feminist analysis has been concerned precisely with investigating the implications and dynamics of gender in all
aspects of lived experience. Furthermore, feminism is generally construed to be an inherently socio-political
discourse, which is to say that while philosophy addresses questions of social and political life, it does not
generally see itself as a socially specific or political discourse, at least in many cases or traditionally and in terms
of its traditional questions. Rather, once again, with cornerstone desiderata of objectivity and universality and the
accompanying repudiation of relativism, any discourse which by its nature is culturally and socially specified
would appear to be essentially at odds with philosophy. Moreover, such particularity, seen as the failure of
neutrality and objectivity, would be construed as bias and therefore not just at odds with philosophy, but
problematic from a philosophical point of view.
To the extent that such feminist analyses, when undertaken with respect to philosophy, clearly contravene the
self-definition of philosophy sketched above, this constitutes one of the most salient aspects of the challenge of
feminism to philosophy. At this level the main concern is not so much the uncovering of a particular philosopher's
misogynist claims about women, but rather more fundamentally the articulation of the relevance of gender in
philosophical discourse and activity; that is, to make gender an issue for philosophy, in an endeavour which

extends far beyond the mere highlighting of a "woman's perspective," and points towards fundamental
transformations. In other words, at this level the apparent incompatibilities between feminism and philosophy are,
from a critical point of view, more indicative of the problems with traditional philosophy that feminism seeks to
analyze and address. Arguments for the relevance of gender, as a preamble to examining the import of gender
considerations for philosophy, can only take place within a broader context of inquiry in which the traditional
philosophical tenets of objectivity, neutrality, and universality and their construals are examined. So, in arguing for
the relevance of gender, feminism is necessarily putting into question such tenets that traditionally excluded issues
of gender. By the same token, to look ahead to what I will be developing, any account, such as hermeneutics,
which in taking as its point of departure the re-examination of these tenets, is led to advocate the significance of
situation and context, thereby grounds the possibility for a variety of specified analyses, including that of gender.
Clearly the position I am moving towards is not only that gender is relevant, but that it is relevant for philosophy;
that is, that philosophy is not exempt.4 Many feminist analyses of philosophy have taken this position of course;
here again I am not thinking only of critiques of sexism or misogyny in philosophy, but of feminist analyses of the
implications of gender for traditional philosophical areas, such as the feminist analyses of epistemology or
philosophy of science.5 Even though these analyses move more into a transformative domain where they are no
longer merely critiquing misogyny or sexism in a given area, but setting the groundwork for a fundamental
transformation, they are still nevertheless often very closely tied to the (often earlier) critiques of sexism. One of
the important consequences of such critiques was to reveal the deeper implications of this sexism: the presence of
bias in the philosophical account, expressed in this instance as sexist or masculinist bias, thus undermining
philosophy's claim to neutrality and perfect objectivity.
This is connected for example to discussions dealing with the question of the "maleness" of philosophy—whether
philosophy was systematically masculinized over its history and throughout its development. In other words,
whether philosophy as a discipline and/or as a discursive activity is gendered.6 I cannot do more than merely
characterize these discussions in such a short space, but they involve aspects ranging from the exclusion of
women from philosophy and philosophical thought, to the tracing of male gendered cultural images, traits, and
ideals in the development of philosophy. There are also related accounts concerning the genealogy of such
gender traits and ideals, Nancy Chodorow's psychoanalysis-based object-relations theory perhaps the most
well-known and widely cited.7 The plausibility of such formative gender traits, although often rejected, seems to
be more straightforward provided one situates gender as a cultural construct—I return to this point below. At
any rate, with respect to the question of whether gender categories can be applied to philosophy, the putative
presence of an identifiably masculine bias attests that the account is already gendered.8 As such, the feminist
analysis does not create the gendered account so much as recognizes that an account is already gendered—
recognizes gender as a factor—and then proceeds to analyze the account on the basis of the claims and
omissions that that particular gender framework might have occasioned, redressing and/or supplementing that
account by contributing the perspective of the other gender.
Thus for many feminist analyses, the notion that philosophy and philosophical issues are not exempt from
considerations of gender is arrived at through the disclosure of the presence and implications of gender factors
already operative in philosophical discourse, and in ways which were formative for philosophical discourse. It
might be argued from a more orthodox perspective that even if it were allowed that philosophy demonstrate
gender traces (and even this might not be acknowledged), that given the extent to which this contravenes the
ideals of philosophical discourse, this cannot be admitted as genuine philosophy; rather, such traces are indicative
of bias and various other lapses in objectivity, and this is thus a corrupted discourse.

For one thing, to argue that this might amount only to "lapses in objectivity" would suggest an occasional or
temporary phenomenon. However, a key argument in these analyses of gendered philosophy is that this "bias"
does not appear as merely an occasional aberration, a momentary glitch, but that the roots are deep and
pervasive; in other words, that the presence of gender in this discourse is systemic (much as feminists argue that
sexism is not as such an act, but a systemic process). This case is made particularly in work in the history of
philosophy undertaken by feminists such as Genevieve Lloyd, where gendered or gender-related images and
motifs are traced throughout the history of philosophy, showing not only that they follow a progressive dialectic
as this history unfolds, but that many of these motifs are at the heart and essence of central philosophical
precepts. As Val Plumwood states in a related point:
It would be naive indeed to assume that these conceptions of ruling reason are merely "abuses" of a basically
neutral concept, ideas about reason which have no impact on the construction of reason itself, but have been
entirely accidental and extraneous to it. It has been the task of feminist philosophers particularly to show how the
historical construction of reason as masculine has structured its dominant forms not only in an exclusion and
oppositional relation to women, but to the characteristics and area of life they have been taken to represent, such
as emotionality, bodiliness, animality and particularity.9
Given the numerous instances and the pervasiveness of such aspects, and their key determining roles, it does not
seem possible to characterize them as "lapses," unless one is willing to see extended periods in the history of
philosophy as one long lapse, with the ideal still intact, somewhere, if rarely realized.
Moreover, within a framework arguing for the viability of such cultural factors in philosophy, the notion that
philosophical discourse is gendered (as revealed through a perceived, masculine perspective) is not necessarily
indicative of a problematic defect by virtue of its being gendered: problematic aspects arise in terms of what is
being claimed, not because there is a gendered framework at issue, except insofar as that framework contains
problematic features which may lead to problematic claims. This point is related to the notion of the inevitability
of such frameworks, to which I return below. In other words, the (male) gendered framework which may have
dominated philosophical discourse is not necessarily problematic because it is gendered—i.e., because gender
has played such a role—but rather because at issue is this particular cultural manifestation of gender with all of its
attendant features and ramifications.
In view of the above, the claim that a philosophical account displays masculinist bias mitigates its claims to be
generic, neutral, and objective. The account is not neutral if in fact it operates from a specified perspective—i.e.,
where neutrality would traditionally suggest a-perspectival. And where such perspectives bespeak subjective
stances, here male subjectivity, then claims of objectivity—as non-subjective—are also undermined. Therefore,
as I suggested above, what is necessarily put into question in the consideration of gender and philosophy is the
conception of notions such as objectivity and universality, and the role of cultural determinations in philosophical
discourse. In the larger sense, then, what is at issue is the putative a-contextuality of philosophy, where such acontextuality allegedly grounds the possibility of objective or non-relative claims. In other words gender is a
contextual variable, and in proposing to analyze philosophy from the point of view of gender, the alleged acontextuality of philosophical discourse is necessarily interrogated. Correspondingly, any discourse which has
endeavoured to examine the ways in which philosophical discourse is contextual creates the possibility of the
consideration of gender as a significant factor. In other words, it would be argued that gender is relevant in any
analysis pertaining to human experience and that, as an activity taking place within human experience,
philosophical discourse is not exempt from such considerations.

II. Gendered Reasoning: Methodology Considerations and Setting the Context
Another stream in the discussions of gendered reasoning, in addition to the discussion of gendered philosophy,
operates from the models of specific women's "ways of knowing," "modes of thought," or "forms of reasoning."
Here too there are many different aspects, some of which have been discussed quite extensively in the literature;
indeed several accounts are paradigmatic for exploring the question of gender and reason, from Carol Gilligan's
analyses of the "different voice" and the psychology of gender,10 to the various applications of the "difference"
perspective to "women's ways of knowing" in epistemological terms, women's moral reasoning and feminist
ethics, and even feminist science. Some of these accounts have come under critical fire, and although I don't
necessarily agree with the particular criticisms, I see possible vulnerabilities in these accounts which can admit
such criticisms. Again, I can do no more here than briefly sketch the issues in question, but given the connection
with the overall framework I am developing, even a brief sketch may prove salutary.
My principal concern with some of these accounts is not necessarily the perspectives they may be working
towards establishing—perspectives which I am equally interested in exploring—but rather their orientation; and
here there are clearly larger methodological issues which go beyond the issue in question. In many cases these
accounts are essentially empiricist in orientation—indeed many of them are based in an empirically oriented social
science. In working from the observation and study of traceable gender differences in their subjects' attitudes and
behaviour, they aim at demonstrating the empirical reality of gender differences, and these accounts ground in
turn theories of female moral reasoning and female modes of knowledge. In other words, the justification for the
claims that there are salient gender differences, and that these differences are operative in processes such as
reasoning, is based on the empirical observation and tracking of behavioural, cognitive, attitudinal, and
performance related differences between women and men. On the one hand, such studies supply us with the kind
of empirical and statistical data and confirmatory evidence that is crucial in such analyses. But on the other hand,
when taken alone, they fall prey to the same conceptual and critical difficulties to which strictly empirical analysis
is invariably vulnerable.

In working within an empirical methodology, it is not their primary intention to articulate an interpretive grounding
and horizonal orientation—the fear is that this will predetermine results, so instead the theory is generated later on
the basis of the observed data. I would argue though that without some kind of context of inquiry—going beyond
merely methodological considerations—that such empirical generalizations stand alone and are vulnerable to
other empirical challenges: for example, how reliable the observations are, how comprehensive the sample, and
whether the connections and conclusions drawn are reasonable. If they are disputed for any of these reasons,
they run the risk of being labelled as merely arbitrary, partial or circumstantial conclusions. This is in fact the sort
of criticism that feminist arguments for gendered reasoning have encountered. A common strategy in the counterarguments, for example, is to offer up alternatives or counter-examples to the particular claims made in the
feminist accounts—that is, to compare empirical instances. For example, in discussing claims that women's
thinking is characteristically "narrative-seeking," Sandra Menssen argues that there are many example of stories,
accounts, histories—in other words, narrative—written by men, throughout the history of thought.11 Although
her major point is to question the connection between modes of thought such as narrative and argument—the
imputed connection between these constituting the chief target of her criticism—her point about narrative is clear:
there are sufficient counter-examples to undermine the claims of a unique women's perspective. And furthermore,

these examples, even if plausible, do not necessarily make the case for different modes of thinking, particularly in
terms of "forms of reasoning":
Even if a case could be made that women rely more on dialogue and discussion than men, what
would that tell us about the forms used in reasoning? Does the dialogue contain arguments? If so,
what kinds of arguments? ... Questions like these need to be raised and answered to support a
claim that dialogue and discussion constitute or suggest a form of reasoning not found in
monologues. 12
So even if the examples or characterizations of different modes of thought are accepted, there is still a gap
between a mode of thought—here construed virtually as a "habit of thinking," and a truly different form of
reasoning. It's not clear to me that the kind of account that Menssen requires can be made, although I find the
possibility of it more intriguing than she does. In other words, I would like to see such an account, but I agree
with her—although for different reasons, and from a significantly different orientation—that this approach does
not suffice.
These sorts of challenges to empirical claims are inevitable, and I'm not arguing against the validity of such
challenges. What I am suggesting is that it is the nature of such empirical inquiry to be vulnerable to such
criticisms: in the absence of a theoretical grounding—not as an a priorism, but as the articulated context of
inquiry, the necessary frame of reference—there is nothing in which to situate these observations, thus their risk
of being seen as merely circumstantial or arbitrary. As Husserl pointed out, empirical inquiry makes the fatal error
of presupposing what it seeks to deny—the necessity of some kind of theoretical framework—thus contradicting
itself, but more fundamentally, failing to articulate at a conscious level the necessary cognitive and interpretive
framework which will enable and ground understanding.13 Methodologies are procedural guidelines, not
interpretive frameworks, and the tendency to confuse these two, and the failure to recognize the importance of
the context of inquiry, is for the phenomenological and hermeneutic perspectives one of the classic errors of
empirical inquiry.

What I would argue for then is the idea of a context of inquiry, that is, a founded context of interpretation as
articulated and thematized horizon which situates and enables claims, without pre-determining them. In other
words, a model which is not a priori but hermeneutic, the difference between pre-determining and enabling the
interpretation; a distinction key to the hermeneutic conception of contextuality, which wants to stress at one and
the same time the situatedness of claims while retaining their cognitive freedom. Our claims can be situated
without being predetermined; they can be free without being sovereign. At the same time, for the purposes of an
account of reasoning, my account borrows from a phenomenology of reasoning the structural principles which
enable both descriptive experiential analysis from a situated subjective orientation—even to say a perspective—
which allows for specified analysis, while maintaining the viability and verifiability of the claims that issue from that
process. This is grounded by unfolding particular experiential patterns and regularities of ascertainable reasoning
practices within the theoretical framework of a structural complex within which such discerned patterns are given
meaning and reference.
Clearly the sense of theoretical here is not non-contextual, but rather a sense of structural framework which is
bound to the experiential context within which it functions. By the same token, experiential is not the same as
empirical; a phenomenological-hermeneutic approach seeks to ground its analysis in experience, but in
underscoring the significance and inescapability of contextual situation, it is not empirical as such. In this account,

the contextual situation is a theoretical articulation, and the theoretical and reflective framework are intertwined
with context and experience.14

III. Gendered Reasoning: Towards a Phenomenological-Hermeneutic Model
I am taking, then, this layered notion of contextuality as my focal point. Once again, given the constraints of time,
I can only approach an outline, but it can still serve to lay out the salient features of this approach with respect to
the question at hand. Simply put, the general framework of such a discourse from a phenomenological or
hermeneutic point of view would be that human experience takes place in the lived world and the context which
that lived world constitutes; that such experience is thus contextual, i.e., that it is both informed by and
understandable according to the context in which it occurs; that philosophical discourse is one aspect of human
activity and experience that, by virtue of being an aspect of such experience, necessarily falls under its existential
conditions; philosophical discourse is therefore conditioned by context—philosophy is a contextual enterprise.
Now of course on one level philosophers have always been more than aware of context and experiential
situation, particularly in terms of the potential contingency and variability involved, and one version of the story of
philosophy is the story of the attempt to contravene and supersede this aspect, to wilfully construct the character
of philosophy in defiance of its conditions. The origins of Western philosophy are as such traced in the
resonances of ancient quests to defy the perceived limitations of existence—to live beyond death, or to fly when
one is earthbound—carried through and imprinted subsequently in the modem period, arguably as a key
characteristic of modernity. Indeed, this casting off of mortal coils is characteristically considered a primary
orientation of traditional philosophical discourse and reason in its attempt to articulate a-contextual claims and
theory, i.e., claims that transcend context, that manage to disengage from their primary contextual situation,
realized perhaps in their most ideal and rarefied form in logic.
We all know what happened to Icarus. Nevertheless, his quest is not insignificant, and this is not to suggest that
he should not have tried what he did. From the hermeneutic stance, though, any such attempt to nullify or
transcend context is at best naive at worst doomed to failure (although perhaps not so dramatically!) This is
grounded on one level in the experiential self-giveness and self-evidence of our situatedness in the surrounding
world, and that this situatedness is not merely an incidental physical determination of space and time, but that it
fundamentally conditions and frames our experience. Such originary insights are in principle verifiable and
justifiable by means of analyses ranging from sociological studies to experiential phenomenological analysis.15
And again, these are insights about our situation that on a basic level are generally acknowledged, and which
account for the Icarus-like efforts to counteract this situation. Yet from a hermeneutic point of view, it is precisely
the fact that such initiatives do require something tantamount to an Icarus-like effort (think of Descartes' arguably
forced, counter-intuitive, and ultimately artificial process in the Meditations) that argues for the claim that these
initiatives are unrealistic and unlikely to succeed. Not that the only possible moves are easy ones; but that there is
something essentially counter-intuitive about the attempt to negate something so fundamental—perhaps so
difficult because it is ultimately impossible.
Disengaging from our fundamental engagement and embeddedness in experiential context, which is not merely
our physical location but our ontological one, shaping our being. In this sense, how can the disengagement
amount to anything but an abstraction, an artificial construct which on one level has certain uses (thus very much
preserving in this framework discourses like logic), provided it is understood for what it is—an idealized
construct—and that in the reality of lived thinking and discourse, claims are made within and in relation to a

contextual situation. As such, given the experiential plausibility of the claim of our situatedness and its
accompanying conditioning effects, the hermeneutic thinker would argue that the burden of proof rests with
whoever would argue for the possibility of neutralizing context, since our shared default sensibility is that we are
deeply embedded. And such arguments would quite naturally be open to being deconstructed as on the one hand
not really succeeding in detaching from context, if contextual traces, biases, or predispositions are still in
evidence, or on the other hand as mere abstractions, which may serve as ideal constructs for certain purposes,
but which are ultimately artificial, managing to escape the contingencies of our reality only by creating another,
irreal one. In other words, like Icarus, if the initiative "succeeds," it is accompanied by the destruction of being as
we knew it.
From the hermeneutic point of view, the necessary contextuality of reflection and discourse is an inevitable
feature and condition of such activity, and attempting to supercede this conditionedness is ultimately not the best
goal for philosophical striving. Rather, philosophical striving must consist in acknowledging and negotiating the
conditions of philosophizing—the hermeneutic philosopher is thus Daedalus, who kept in mind the relevant
intrinsic conditions—and in this manner articulating the nature and viability of philosophizing in the face of the
contingencies of discourse and the inevitability of situation.
As such, with respect to the specific question at hand, given the inevitable contextuality of reflection and
discourse, these activities are particularly realized as practices, informed by socio-cultural factors in a broad
sense, and all the attendant specific variables included therein. Thus reasoning too is a particular practice, and
reasoning as such cannot be separated from the practice of reasoning; except once again in a formal idealized
sense, if we wanted to postulate what reasoning would be like, were it not subject to the fundamental conditions
and framework to which it is subject. Along the lines of the above account, reasoning as a human cognitive
activity always takes place in a human experiential process and context and is as such situated by that context—
i.e., informed and conditioned by its situatedness. If reasoning is situated and invariably conditioned by the sociocultural and political context in which it functions, a context in which gender figures as a variable, then it will
follow that reasoning, as a practice in that context, is potentially informed by gender.16
This position then requires acceptance—along with the notions of the situatedness of reason in a conditioning
context—of the significance of gender as a cultural variable, both in terms of (a) the validity of gender difference
(since without the presupposition of difference, presumably gender as we usually understand it would not have
much discernible conditioning effect) and in terms of (b) the role and influence played by gender and gender
difference in our experience. With regard to (a), we start with the definition of gender as a particular cultural
socialization process, where selected traits, behaviours, and characteristics are encultured on the basis of
perceived biological sex differences—people are "gendered" in specific social, cultural, and political ways. As
such, it would be quite plausible to argue that if the different biological sexes have conditioned differential social
traits, and that these traits are potentially determinative in their activities, then it could follow that philosophical
discourse, as one activity, is shaped by these traits. In this case it is not even necessary to make arguments about
nature or essences arguments which cannot be conclusive, since all we have to go is an already encultured
experience.
With respect to (b), it is conceivable, for instance, to recognize the conditioning effects of various contextual
variables, without granting that all variables have equal or significant effect. It is therefore necessary to make the
case that gender as a cultural variable does in fact exercise a particularly substantial effect (though not necessarily
the only, or strongest effect). Here is where the feminist analyses of gender in philosophy such as those sketched
above can be positioned, as accounts arguing not only for the presence of the variable of gender, but also for the

strength, depth and extent of its influence as a variable.
Given all this, we are left with the final issue of the validity of philosophical claims in light of the preceding
considerations and in the framework of this account. For while this approach I am articulating might renounce the
possibility of unconditioned claims, it does not renounce the possibility of philosophical claims—Daedalus, after
all, also built wings. The difficulty, of course, in any appeal to contextuality is the risk that reasoning is reduced to
a mere concatenation of environmental factors—a kind of cultural naturalism, if you will—in other words, a
cultural relativism where what that reasoning generates in the way of knowledge or truth claims becomes subject
to the usual difficulties of relativism.
Isn't any account that argues for the situatedness of discourse and the conditioning effects of context running the
risk of relativism? And isn't any account that seeks to emphasize women's specific orientation, a particularity like
gender, the perspective gender affords in experience, and the particular perspective women's gender affords,
tantamount to a perspectivism, in this case a gender perspectivism? In other words, feminism as relativism, as
some feminists have (disapprovingly) suggested. And the issue, of how to account for this kind of specificity—a
gender perspective, without reverting to perspectivism—has I think not been sufficiently addressed in the feminist
analyses of gendered reasoning.
My position is that there is a difference between a gendered perspective and gender perspectivism. That is, it is
possible to hold to conditioned and contextualized rationality without falling into the bog of relativism. Such a
position has always been the fundamental stance of phenomenological epistemology, and to a lesser extent
hermeneutics.17 The basic justification consists in presenting an account of reasoning, as I suggested above,
which allows for experiential and specified analysis, while maintaining the viability and verifiability of the claims
that issue from that process. This is in essence the goal of the phenomenological account, especially with respect
to epistemological issues. This involves presenting cognition as an experiential, subjective process which can in
many respects reflect the various aspects of that subjectivity—for example, that it is situated and orientational,
that it is in and part of the lived world (in terms of the rich phenomenological concept of world), thus that it is
"worldly" as such, even perspectival. Yet at the same time, in the phenomenological project, this situated
subjective orientation undertakes to generate a firmly non-relativistic descriptive experiential analysis within which
claims can be grounded and verified. In other words, the account of subjectivity as such, as the possibility of
articulating generalities which correspond to the situation of being a subject, from a subject's point of view,
without such an account amounting to no more than arbitrary and unfounded claims.
Such an account seeks to ground itself thus in the possibility of articulating generalities (to be distinguished from
generalizations), based on the idea of structural principles of cognition which are not the Kantian model, but
correspond more to particular experiential patterns and regularities of reasoning, which are discernible and
verifiable through phenomenological analysis. In other words, they are invariant structures which run through the
experiential variance as the cognitive spine, providing the necessary synthesis to what would otherwise be a
random, chaotic, and unintelligible concatenation of disconnected experiential moments and acts. Thus even
though claims may issue from a situated and even specified orientation, they also correspond to larger structural
regularities which amount as such to practices of reasoning, and not merely individual random reasoning acts. It
is through the notion of practices and regularities of reasoning that possibilities of objectivity are preserved within
specified accounts. In other words, the account is both situated and grounded.
As such the rearticulation that I alluded to earlier, of notions of objectivity and the grounding of claims is also
very much a feature of this project—it does not abandon objectivity, but redefines it according to the

considerations and parameters of this framework which, as should be clear by now, has the critique of traditional
notions of objectivity and the idea of the necessity of rethinking these notions as an intrinsic feature. Objectivity is
no longer conceived to mean what is non-subjective or detached from experience; instead the notion of
objectivity issuing from a phenomenological account can be characterized as a "subjective objectivity"; a term
which reflects the subjective yet non-relativistic nature of this notion which, it is maintained, is appropriate not
only for a phenomenological account but for any account. Correspondingly, recognizing that experience has
relativity is not the same as accepting relativism. As an account whose point of departure is that cognition and
reasoning are subjective processes, yet whose cornerstone is also the rejection of relativism and the articulation
of the possibility of epistemically justifiable claims, phenomenology frames its project as the analysis of the
irrelative of all the relativities of experience. Within a notion of conditioned rationality, such an analysis thus
constitutes the basis for a viable sense of rationality, and the possibility of meaning and understanding.
In closing, I would argue that the phenomenological-hermeneutic account provides a better founded and more
viable theoretical structure for discussions of conditioned reasoning, in this case gendered reasoning in particular.
While other accounts may provide empirical cases and evidence of gendered reasoning, such accounts are
vulnerable to counter-argumentation on the basis of counter-examples or alternative interpretations of the
instances in question. In contrast, in providing an account of the nature of conditioned and contextualized
discourse, the phenomenological-hermeneutic framework furnishes an internally coherent and grounded basis—
the context—for a plausible account of gendered reasoning, precisely by grounding this instance of contextual
and particularized reasoning in the larger account of contextualized discourse. Thus some of the conceptual and
critical difficulties to which the feminist "difference" accounts of gendered reason can fall prey are arguably
avoided. At the same time, one of the issues left open in many feminist accounts of gendered reason—a gender
perspective without perspectivism—can be addressed. In so doing one of the traditional barriers to accepting
notions of conditioned reasoning—in this case gendered reasoning—can perhaps be alleviated.
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